Two expert system development projects were studied to evaluate a proposed Expert Systems Development Methodology (ESDM). The ESDM was develreduce the next largest area of risk or uncertainty on the project.
oped for use at Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) to provide guidance to managers and technical personnel and serve as a standard in the development of expert systems. It was agreed that the proposed ESDM must be evaluated before it could be adopted; therefore a study was planned for its evaluation. This detailed study is now underway. Before the study began, however, two ongoing projects were selected for a retrospective evaluation. They were the Ranging Equipment Diagnostic Expert System (REDEX) and the Backup Control Mode Analysis and Utility System (BCAUS). Both projects were approximately 1 year into development.
Interviews of project personnel were conducted, and the resulting data was used to prepare the retrospective evaluation.
Decision models of the two projects were constructed and used to evaluate the completeness and accuracy of key provisions of ESDM. A major conclusion reached from these case studies is that suitability and risk analysis should be required for all AI projects, large and small. Further, the objectives of each stage of development during a project should be selected to
INTRODUCTION
The Expert Systems Development Methodology (ESDM) is intended to be applied to the development of expert systems at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration/Goddard Space Flight Center (NASA/GSFC).
The methodology is based on a survey of existing methodologies, experience in developmg a number of expert systems at GSFC, and an analysis of the expert system life cycle. Dr. Barry W. Boehm introduced a risk-driven methodology for conventional systems development in his spiral model for software development (Boehm, 1988) . ESDM, while independently generated, is also a risk-driven methodology that can be represented by a spiral model with the focus on knowledge acquisition as opposed to product development. Figure 1 shows the spiral model of ESDM.
Risks are inherent in all system development projects, but they are greater in ES development because of the uncertainties associated with modeling human expert decision processes.
At the outset of the development of an expert system, it is not known whether an expert's decision processes are cognitive processes that can be modeled by ES The REDEX project was initiated by the Telecommunication Systems Branch (Code 531) at GSFC as a task assignment. There were two persons assigned to the project initially, but the level of effort has averaged less than two full-time persons.
No formal risk or suitability analysis of the project was performed.
The use of an expert system as a diagnostic aid for the RE was considered feasible because the RE had been designed with a large number of built-in test points. It was expected that these test points would greatly facilitate the automation of fault diagnosis, and the task of REDEX was to speed up the identification process.
Development staff personnel were generally familiar with the provisions of ESDM. On their own initiative, they selected ESDM features that they believed would assist them in the development of REDEX and used them in the project. The selected features were:
•
The use of a staged development Over 50 graphic and tabular displays have been implemented. to order the mode transition and why that error condition occurred so that they may take the proper corrective action. The OBC was not designed, however, to provide the triggering information or the diagnostic information to the operator.
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Input information to BCAUS will be provided by telemetry data from GRO and by user input. Output from BCAUS will be provided only to the diagnostician. There is no output back to the spacecraft. Figure 3 shows a diagram of the information flows in BCAUS.
GSFC also initiated the BCAUS project by issuing a task assignment.
Two persons were assigned to the project.
No formal risk or suitability analysis of BCAUS was performed. Task personnel had knowledge of the risk areas in expert system development and used this information to guide the development process. The primary area of risk for BCAUS was in the knowledge acquisition process. Four sources of expertise were identified and were initially considered adequate for the development task. These four sources were (1)documentation, found that the knowledge acquisition task for this system was more difficult than initially thought and that the initial evaluation of risk had to be modified. The project goals have therefore shifted from providing an operational system to a system in which the knowledge base is easily modified and updated on the basis of actual experience. In brief, the goal has shifted from providing an initially operational system to an adaptive system with an initial base of knowledge that can be upgraded as expertise is acquired. The first prototype system, a feasibility prototype, was implemented on a PC-386 class machine using the KES hypothesize-and-test (liT) inference engine developed by Software Architecture and Engineering, Inc. Basic structural knowledge of the system elements was loaded on the machine in three weeks by two persons. No rules were needed because of the built-in diagnostic feature of ICES HE. When KES HT was selected initially, there were some known limitations on its capabilities.
Following its use on the project, it became clear that the limitations were too restrictive, especially in the area of explanatory power. The second prototyping system selected was ART-IM, an expert system development shell produced by Inference Corporation, which can run on both the 386 machine and a Silicon Graphics Iris 4D/20. The Iris has considerably more power for graphics than the 386 machine.
The BCAUS system will also have a neural network front end to provide trending data on input telemetry signals. Project personnel determined that it might be possible to implement trending analysis using ART-IM rules, but at the expense of making the system much larger and more complex than desirable. The software product, Neural Works Professional II, from Neural Ware, Inc., was selected to implement the trending analysis.
The BCAUS system's graphics interface shows relevant subsystems in the form of functional block diagrams, similar to those implemented in REDEX, with highlighted potential problem areas. A hierarchical traverse is planned for navigation of the diagrams and causal graphs.
As was the case with REDEX, there was a strong tendency to follow the methodology used for conventional software systems, and the hardware and software selections were set very early in the project. The deadlines for hardware and software selection were met only through very concentrated effort on the part of the project's development staff.
PROJECT KEY DECISIONS
In the evaluation process, ESDM was modeled as a sequence of key decisions plus subsidiary decisions.
Key decisions are identified on the basis of their possible impacts on project cost and schedule.
The key decisions of ESDM are:
•
Start. The decision that the project is suitable for implementation by an expert system is based on a formal suitability analysis in ESDM.
Knowledge-oriented approach.
Is current knowledge about the problem sufficient to permit preparation of specifications for the system now? If not, then a knowledgeoriented approach is indicated, that is, the decision is made to acquire the missing information first. There is no information on whether any formal analysis of suitability was made by GSFC personnel. In retrospect, it is clear that both projects were, in fact, suitable.
By now, the usefulness of expert systems for fault diagnosis has been well established; this fact can be considered generally well known in the computer field.
The ESDM provision that recommends a suitability analysis for each new project should be amended to take into account current practices, informal standards, and common knowledge among practitioners in the computer field. The study concluded that a more formal analysis of suitability should still be performed for any system that does not fall into one of the familiar categories of expert system applications.
The decision regarding a formal suitability analysis on any new project is a judgment call. Nevertheless, ESDM must continued to provide the guidelines and procedures for cases requiring a suitability analysis.
It was apparent even from a casual analysis of both REDEX and BCAUS that it was impossible to prepare specifications at the outset for either project and that a knowledge acquisition process would be required.
What is important, however, is that knowledge acquisition procedures are required and that
identifying the missing pieces of information is necessary in order to develop the systems. The identification of this information was carried out on both projects.
Both the REDEX and BECAUS projects were staffed with experienced AI professionals. ESDM guidelines call for both knowledge engineers and AI programmers.
Because of the small size of the projects, however, it was necessary for project personnel to function both as knowledge engineers and as AI programmers.
Also, project personnel assumed some of the functions of domain experts ESDM should be modified to take the special requirements of small projects into account, but the need for experienced and competent staff personnel becomes even more acute for these smaller projects. Managers should remain aware of the staffing requirement differences in small and large projects.
Both REDEX and BCAUS were decomposed into successive stages of work. ESDM recommends defining stages in terms of risk and addressing areas of highest risk first. While there was no conscious decision to follow ESDM provisions on selecting stages, REDEX personnel nevertheless followed the feasibility, research, and field stages quite faithfully. REDEX also decomposed the planned system into three subsystems (functional, user interface, and communications interface) and followed the riskreduction sequencing in each subsystem. Staging was also followed on BCAUS. The first year of work on BCAUS was considered to be the feasibility stage.
ESDM defines the research stage as that stage of work that establishes that one or a small set of rules can be implemented. The issue to be addressed then is whether enough of the required rules can be implemented to make the system practical. A better name for this stage should reflect the intent of the stage, that is, determining how far the feasibility prototype can be extended.
The name, extensibility stage, has been suggested as a replacement.
Both projects followed some natural sequence of work within the stages that was similar to the steps described in ESDM.
In fact, the steps within the stages recommended in ESDM are a paraphrase of the scientific method, which is the model for knowledge acquisition or discovery processes.
There was no formal analysis of risks made on either REDEX or BCAUS; however, both development teams reported being acutely aware of the risks associated with different areas of their projects at all times and stated that their work was governed by this awareness.
This awareness of risk characterizes the experience of the development teams. Less experienced personnel might not have the opportunity to put together workable and useful systems.
On small projects, there is less need for formal analysis of risk. The lack of a formal analysis on small projects should not be a concern to managers, as long as the staff is aware of risks and is guided by their consideration.
On large projects, the use of a formal risk analysis is still recommended.
ESDM provisions are being modified to take the size of the project into account.
There are no plans to transfer REDEX or BCAUS to a conventional development cycle after preparation of system requirements. On small NASA projects, the personnel who began the project will typically carry on the development even after requirements have been specified and risks reduced to an acceptable levels. Transfer to a conventional life cycle with a new development team, which was recommended in ESDM for large projects, will probably be the exception, rather than the rule, for most small projects. 
CONCLUSIONS
The two projects surveyed match the model of the expert system development life cycle so closely that the experience gamed on these projects provides valuable information for ESDM evaluation. The two projects are quite different in detail and dynamics, and they differ from the expected large-size project envisioned by ESDM. The experience of these projects is useful primarily in providing ESDM with extensions to cover the cases of small-size projects.
General conclusions reached from the retrospective study of the two projects include:
• Confirmation of the need for a methodology.
The standard systems development methodology matches the life cycle of expert systems poorly. The need for a methodology better suited to the special requirements of expert systems is supported by project experience.
• Support for the use of a risk-based approach.
Both project teams reported that they were aware of risks in development and organized their projects to address these risks. ESDM formalizes this practice in ES development.
•
The decomposition of projects into successive stages. Both projects broke the work down into successive stages to make the overall task more manageable.
Requirements as an overall goal. Both projects produced requirements documents at the conclusion of an extensive knowledge acquisition phase in accordance with the recommendations of ESDM.
Based on the evaluations provided by the two projects, REDEX and BCAUS, it was possible to reach some specific conclusions about the details of ESDM and the framework to be used for its evaluation on the two pilot projects.
• ESDM currently requires a formal suitability analysis for all projects.
Findings suggest that this requirement should be relaxed for small projects.
• ESDM should be modified to describe the differences between small and large projects. In particular, some of the formal documents required for projects are unnecessary for small projects and may impose an unnecessary burden.
• 
